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Classical theory on the commons holds that rules are fundamental to sustainability.
However, open access may be present in many sustainable socioecological systems.
Here, we explore the interaction between environmental unpredictability and cooper-
ation in a ﬁshery in the Pantanal wetland, Brazil. We show that a variable annual ﬂood
pulse combined with channel blockages results in a high turnover in ﬁshing grounds.
To counter this variability, ﬁshers openly share information about ﬁshing areas with
all community members, but are highly territorial with neighboring communities. We
argue that this open access within communities but common property between com-
munities represents a system of limited open access and, using a mathematical model,
suggest that such a system is favored under conditions of moderate competition and
high levels of resource unpredictability. Failing to take into account the social norms
that underpin limited open access systems may undermine conservation interventions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Conservation interventions that are not in tune with local
livelihoods may not only jeopardize the well-being of local
people (Milner-Gulland et al., 2014) but also exacerbate
impacts on the environment (Adams & Hutton 2007). Clas-
sical theory on the commons holds that the most eﬀective
management strategy for assuring sustainability in socioe-
cological systems is to guarantee that a set of institutional
arrangements (or rules) are present, such as well-deﬁned
boundaries, cost sharing, and formal sanctions (Ostrom,
2011; Vollan & Ostrom 2010). Where these conditions are
met, people weighing up the costs and beneﬁts of maximizing
the use of natural resources could reach sustainability (Vollan
& Ostrom 2010). Following this, many conservation inter-
ventions focusing on the establishment of strong institutional
arrangements have brought great improvement (Schnegg,
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2018). For example, the introduction of clear resource use
boundaries and the sanctioning of rule violators in the Mami-
rauá reserve (Amazon ﬂoodplain) led to a nine-fold increase
in the population of arapaima species and a 10-fold increase
in local catch (Campos-Silva & Peres 2016; Castello, Viana,
Watkins, Pinedo-Vasquez, & Luzadis, 2009).
Recently, however, scholars have been challenging the
dichotomy between “rules” (property regimes) leading to sus-
tainability and “no rules” (open access) leading to a tragedy
of the commons, as presented in the classical theory on the
commons (Behnke, Robinson, & Milner-Gulland, 2016).
Open access may be present in many socioecological systems,
especially in those areas facing seasonal changes such as con-
centrated rainfall and ﬂood pulses (Moritz, Scholte, Hamilton,
& Kari, 2013). According to Moritz, Hamilton, Scholte, and
Chen (2014), the unpredictable distribution of resources in
such systems often leads users to have extensive harvesting
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areas, allocating themselves in an ideal free distribution with
weak boundaries between people and the resources they use,
or no boundaries at all (Behnke et al., 2016). Such a system
has been described as an Open Property Regime. Where this
is the case, imposing top-down institutional arrangements,
such as deﬁned boundaries of resource use may be counter-
productive, limiting the mobility of users and hindering their
ability to track the spatiotemporal distribution of resources,
jeopardizing livelihoods (Adams & Hutton 2007; Moritz
et al., 2014). However, our understanding of the factors that
promote open access versus territoriality in communities
living in unpredictable environments is underdeveloped, and
the question remains as to whether open access and common
property regimes can coexist (Schnegg, 2018).
Understanding how “bottom-up” systems of resource
management emerge requires an appreciation of the dynam-
ics of cooperation and competition within and between
groups. For individuals, there is an incentive to “free ride”
by taking more from a public resource than is contributed
or by extracting resources unsustainably, as in the classic
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). The problem of free
riding can potentially be solved by within group processes
such as third-party punishment, policing, reputation, and
conditional reciprocity (Nowak, 2006; Ostrom, 1990; West,
Griﬃn, & Gardner, 2007). However, it is also possible that
intense competition between cultural groups may promote
within-group cooperation (García & van den Bergh 2011;
Traulsen & Nowak 2006; Waring & Acheson 2018).
This article focuses on a salient but little studied freshwater
ﬁshery in the 160,000 km2 Pantanal wetland, western Brazil.
For many years, conservation interventions attempted to
tackle alleged overﬁshing in this region by restricting the
use of ﬁshing gears, imposing ﬁshing quotas, closing ﬁshing
grounds, and displacing local people (Chiaravalloti, 2017a).
Using the Pantanal wetland as a case study, we show that
the unpredictable nature of the Pantanal restricts ﬁshers from
using most of the ﬂoodplain, allowing ecological sustainabil-
ity without need for social rules, formal or informal sanctions.
This ecological dynamic, combined with the social organi-
zation of local people, promotes a behavior of limited open
access, in which ﬁshers openly share territory and information
about the location of ﬁsh within their communities but restrict
the access of ﬁshers from other communities. Based on a sim-
ple mathematical model, we suggest that limited open access
is favorable when there are moderate levels of competition
for resources and low predictability in resource distribution.
2 METHODS
2.1 The Pantanal and the flood pulse
The Pantanal wetland annual ﬂood pulse takes between 3
and 4 months to pass through (Junk et al., 2006). The timing,
duration, and extent of the ﬂood diﬀers greatly from year
to year (Hamilton, Sippel, & Melack, 1996). Fishing in the
Pantanal is focused on large ﬁsh and on bait (either small ﬁsh
or crabs) and represents over 90% of the local income (ECOA,
2013). Due to variability in the ﬂood pulse location, diﬀerent
populations of the same species of crab and ﬁsh migrate and
reach their peak abundance at diﬀerent times (Resende, 2011).
This research was focused on the Western Border of
the Pantanal, a region in which around 600 people within
70 families live, clustered in three main settlements. Settle-
ment 1, the main focus of this study, has a population of 97
people living in 23 households, grouped into three extended
families. This study focuses on the 33,651 ha used by ﬁshers
from Settlement 1 (Chiaravalloti, 2017a).
2.2 Data collection
2.2.1 Availability of fishing grounds
In order to understand the availability of ﬁshing grounds, we
used two sets of six scenes of Brazilian Rapid Eye satellite
images (5-meter resolution, 2011 and 2014) to classify all
water bodies that could be used as ﬁshing grounds within Set-
tlement 1′s region. We considered only water bodies larger
than 0.5 ha to be viable ﬁshing grounds. This ﬁne scale
allowed us to verify whether each of the water bodies clas-
siﬁed were connected to the main river or not. Water bod-
ies commonly lose connection to the main river when ﬂoat-
ing mats of vegetation get stuck in river channels or bay
mouths, closing them oﬀ or, more occasionally, when river
channels themselves change (Assine et al., 2015). Since out-
board powered canoes cannot cross vegetation blockages, a
blocked water body cannot be used for ﬁshing.
2.2.2 Customary practices
Three years of qualitative ethnographic data collection were
undertaken in the Western Border of the Pantanal, especially
in Settlement 1 (in 2014, 2015, and 2017). We undertook
participant observation and semistructured interviews using
printed maps in order to gain a better understanding of the pat-
terns of access and cooperation, and how people see control
of resources and sharing. In total, 80 people were interviewed,
60 from Settlement 1.
3 RESULTS
The territory of ﬁshers from Settlement 1 contains 464 water
bodies, encompassing 14,639 ha of water. In 2011, 75.2% of
all water bodies were inaccessible (349), although this only
represented 16.17% (2,367.41 ha) of the total area of water. In
2014, the number of closed water bodies increased to 79.5%
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F IGURE 1 Map 1: Fishing eﬀort in the four regions (A, B, C, and D). Map 2: Highlights the availability of water bodies in part of the region
D (data for 2011)
(369), representing 22.99% of all water areas (Supporting
Information Table S1) (Figure 1).
Since ﬁsh and crab reproduction is related to the ﬂood
pulse, variation in the timing and extent of the ﬂood pulse
also creates temporal variability in ﬁsh stocks. This means
that ﬁshers need not only to locate accessible water bod-
ies but water bodies that contain ﬁsh at that particular time.
Thus, both the accessibility of water bodies and spatial vari-
ation in the ﬂood wave drive variability in the distribu-
tion of viable ﬁshing grounds. Considering both drivers,
the percentage of available areas is drastically reduced
(Figure 2). Given that the unpredictable nature of the ﬂood
pulse and the changes in vegetation blockages (Supporting
Information Table S2) eﬀectively “reset” the system each
year, the knowledge ﬁshers gain about the accessibility and
economic viability of water bodies in one year is rarely of use
in the following year.
Fishers from Settlement 1 openly share information about
the location of productive ﬁshing pools with everyone in the
community, regardless of family ties. The information about
productive ﬁshing or gathering spots typically occurs dur-
ing several ice tea drinking sessions held each day (“tereré”),
F IGURE 2 Proportion of ﬁshing areas that were accessible
(black) and inaccessible (grey) in 2011 and 2014 in periods A, B, C,
and D
in which people from the diﬀerent extended families par-
ticipate. Although some people complained that not every-
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F IGURE 3 (a) Shows the relationship between
group size and maximum payoﬀ under three diﬀerent
competition levels. (b) Shows the relationship between
competition and resource patchiness and the predicted
outcome of the diﬀerent combinations of the two
parameters
one tells the truth, we regularly saw ﬁshers visiting other
people's houses in order to verify catches and to establish
trust regarding the information that they had been given. This
open system of information sharing appears to occur with-
out any kind of clear punishment being recorded in the rare
cases where people were not truthful about productive ﬁshing
spots.
In general, the system works in the following way: some
people go to ﬁsh in a speciﬁc location and others look for
new ones. If someone manages to ﬁnd a more productive ﬁsh-
ing location, they will inform the others, and everyone moves
there. This method is repeated throughout the ﬁshing season.
Because the ﬂood pulse keeps moving from north to south,
people have to regularly move their ﬁshing sites and ﬁnd new
ﬁshing spots. They will rarely stay at the same ﬁshing site for
more than a week. Throughout the year this process creates a
rotational ﬁshing system.
Critically, the open cooperation and reciprocity shown by
people from Settlement 1 toward other members of their com-
munity does not extend to people from outside their commu-
nity. They neither shared information with nor allowed people
from other settlements to use water bodies located inside their
group's territory. Two cases of forced sanctions were reported
regarding outsiders trying to move in to Settlement 1′s area of
use. Although less well-studied, people from Settlement 2 and
Settlement 3 had a similar notion of territory and reciprocity
among community members. This suggests a system of lim-
ited open access, whereby information and territory are freely
shared with members of the community but not with those
from neighboring communities, who are actively excluded.
In order to understand the conditions under which a system
of limited open access would be favored, we created a math-
ematical model. The model considers a population of n indi-
viduals extracting resources from an environment composed
of discrete locations that either contain resources or contain
no resources. The parameter P determines the probability that
a randomly chosen location contains recourses. In the case of
the Pantanal, P represents the proportion of ﬁshing pools con-
taining ﬁsh that are accessible to ﬁshers. The probability of a
lone individual successfully harvesting resources from a ran-
domly selected pool is therefore P. Where individuals go to
separate locations and then share information about the loca-
tion of resources, they have a greater chance of ﬁnding some-
thing. In fact, large groups may successfully ﬁnd several loca-
tions containing resources. To generalize, the probability of a






𝑃 𝑖 (1 − 𝑃 )𝑛−𝑖. (1)
Thus, by sharing information in larger groups, individuals
increase their likelihood of successfully locating a resource.
This group beneﬁt is particularly pronounced when P is low
(i.e., when resources are diﬃcult to ﬁnd).
However, by sharing information about the location of
resources, individuals may increase competition between
individuals for resources. In the model, the degree of com-
petition is determined by parameter d. The resources that an








where n is the total population and i is the number of resource
containing locations available to the population. Combining
Equations (1) and (2), we can deﬁne the expected payoﬀ of
an individual sharing information about resource location in














Varying only d and P, we can ﬁnd three diﬀerent kinds of
payoﬀ curves associated with group living. Figure 3a shows
these three kinds of payoﬀs at three diﬀerent levels of d at
P = 0.03. When there is no competition associated with shar-
ing a location (i.e., when d = 1, dotted line in Figure 3a), each
additional group member increases the expected payoﬀ of all
group members. Such conditions would favor a completely
open system in which information is shared among all group
members. In contrast, if competition between individuals is
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very high (d = 0.4, dashed line), the maximum payoﬀ is to act
alone and to never share information with others. However,
for intermediate values of d, such as at d = 0.85 (solid line),
there is an optimum group size and, as such, the best strategy
is to share information with only a subset of the population.
We characterize this as a system of limited open access, and
suggest that such a system is favored by moderate competition
and unpredictable resource distribution, as seen in the case of
the Pantanal described above.
4 DISCUSSION
Many conservation interventions are focused on guarantee-
ing ecological sustainability regardless of the social conse-
quences (Milner-Gulland et al., 2014). The ﬁshers of the
Pantanal described here have been facing strict top-downmea-
sures in order to tackle a supposed overﬁshing, jeopardizing
livelihoods (Chiaravalloti, 2016). However, we have shown
that restrictions imposed by the system itself on the use of eco-
nomically viable ﬁshing grounds limit ﬁshing to less than 10%
of all available water bodies for much of the year. Although
the unpredictability of this system creates environmental lim-
its that hinder the possible overexploitation of ﬁsh (Chiaraval-
loti, Homewood, & Erikson, 2017; Welcomme & Hagborg
1977), cultural values, alternative livelihoods, a low popula-
tion density, and the use of relatively simple technology may
also contribute in safeguarding the ﬁsh stocks. Indeed, studies
in the Pantanal have shown no signs of overﬁshing (Mateus,
Vaz, & Catella, 2011). Local sustainability may be achieved
simply by respecting this ecological dynamic.
We suggest that, for Pantanal ﬁshers, openly sharing infor-
mation about productive ﬁshing spots with community mem-
bers while restricting it from outsiders may allow individu-
als to optimize their ﬁshing return rates. While within groups
we see a system of open access and between groups we see a
classical common property regime (Ostrom, 2011). We char-
acterize the combination of these two regimes as a system of
limited open access. Such a system has also been described
elsewhere. For example, Behnke et al. (2016) showed that
open access and common property regimes work together
among pastoralists in Turkmenistan. Similarly, Beitl (2015)
shows that a community of cockle ﬁshers in Ecuador shares
an ethos of open access among themselves but quickly dis-
play a sense of territory and shared property when their area
is threatened by shrimp farmers.
We argue that the system of limited open access that we see
in the Pantanal is the result of within-group cooperation and
between-group competition for patchily distributed resources.
Although our mathematical model assumes that agents coop-
erate within groups to share information about resource dis-
tribution, in reality cooperation is the product of the complex
social dynamics that may operate at the level of the individ-
ual (i.e., reciprocity, reputation, punishment, or ostracism) or
may be a product of competition between groups (García &
van den Bergh 2011; Traulsen & Nowak 2006; Waring et al.,
2015). Theoretical work has suggested that within-group
cooperation and between-group exclusion may be causally
linked, with cultural institutions relating to resource conser-
vation within groups being favored by between-group compe-
tition (Waring et al., 2015), a theory that has been advanced
to explain the emergence of territorial lobstering in Maine
(Waring & Acheson 2018). Further ethnographic research in
the Pantanal is required to better understand the processes by
which within-group cooperation is maintained.
The role of cooperation, competition, and resource distri-
bution in shaping human social organization has been dis-
cussed by human behavioral ecologists for some time. For
example, Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) present a model
about the presence of territoriality under diﬀerent levels of
resource abundance and unpredictability, suggesting that the
presence of territorial strategy depends on the cost-beneﬁt
ratio of defending resources, with unpredictability favoring
weak boundaries (Fernández-Giménez, 2002). Supporting
this, Berge (1997) showed that in Saharan rangelands, the
harsh climate restricts the use of resources by Tuareg pastoral-
ists’, favoring an open access system. The opposite is also true,
with clearer boundaries appearing with more a predictable
and dense distribution of resources (Ostrom, 2011). Limited
open access also has parallels with the ﬂexible land access and
food sharing described for small-scale hunter-gatherer soci-
eties (Bliege Bird, Codding, & Bird, 2016; Dyble et al. 2016;
Dyson-Hudson & Smith 1978; Winterhalder, 1996).
5 CONCLUSION
The emergence of “bottom-up” rules governing resource use
is shaped by a range of historic, economic, ecological, and
anthropological factors such as historical enforcement, and
physical and economic displacement (Behnke et al., 2016;
Chiaravalloti et al., 2017). Therefore, parameters, such as
group size, levels of sharing and sanctions toward commu-
nity members and outsiders may vary according to marks
imprinted in de facto resource use patterns. However, through
our ethnography and mathematical modeling, we suggest that
socioecological systems under similar conditions to the West-
ern Border of the Pantanal (high unpredictability and moder-
ate competition) may neither work as an open property regime
(Moritz, 2016) nor as a classic common property resource
management regime (Vollan & Ostrom 2010), but can work as
a limited open access regime. Where such regimes exist, con-
servation interventions should take them into account in order
to support local livelihoods. In terms of policy, this could
be achieved by the creation of ﬂexibly bounded protected
areas that allow access according to diﬀerent tenure rights
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(Chiaravalloti, 2017b). Within the Brazilian legislation this
could be done through the creation of sustainable develop-
ment protected areas that partly fulﬁll these requirements.
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